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TI[E ROLE OF THE LAW REVIEW
IN THE TRADITION OF
JUDICIAL SCHOLARSHIP
KEVNETH F. PpE'
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, a distinguished member of the federal judiciary wrote an article whose tide ended with the despairing exclamation: Never Another Learned Hand.' In that article, the judge
predicted that the ranks of the federal appellate judiciary would
never again see work product of the caliber of Learned Hand's
day.2 In the judge's view, the reason for that decline was the work
pressures that today's federal judges bear and the concomitant lack
of adequate time to participate in the broader intellectual life of
3
the profession.
Some judges question the severity and extent of the work pressures that caused that despairing exclamation. 4 Others, although
accepting that the current situation impedes adequate study and
reflection, differ on the precise causes of that pressure. Yet, it is
difficult to find any federal appellate judge who is willing to accept
the inevitability of the judge's blunt prediction about the future intellectual life of the nation'sjudiciary. There seems to be near unanimity that his exclamation must be treated not as a message of
inevitable doom, but as a challenge.
Attempting to meet that challenge, judges participate in a variety of professional activities in an effort to keep current on the developments in the law and, indeed, in many other disciplines that
intersect the legal enterprise. The efforts of the judiciary to continue to grow intellectually, despite the drain that their daily responsibilities place on their energies, has become a matter of
significant public discussion. For instance, both within the legal
profession and beyond it, thoughtful commentators have discussed
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Professor of
Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. Howard T. Markey, On the PresentDeterioration of lhe FederalAppellate Process:
Never Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. RE%,. 371 (1988).

2. See id. at 371, 379-83.
3. See id. at 377, 379-83.
4. See RicAn A. POsNER, Tm FEDERAL CouRTs: CHALLEGE AND REFOR.

150

n.46 (1996).
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the ramifications of judicial attendance at various educational programs sponsored or financed by groups that have a direct or indirect interest in the resolution of matters that regularly come before
the courts. 5
This article explores one of the most important sources ofjudicial education, the law review. Part I first examines, by way of introduction, why continued intellectual growth is so important to the
American jurist of today. It then sets forth the growth of the law
review as an institution within the legal profession. Part II examines the various roles that law reviews play traditionally in the intellectual life of a judge and suggests, with respect to each, certain
improvements in the judge-law review relationship designed both to
enhance the effectiveness of the law review as an intellectual companion and to avoid ethical pitfalls that can corrupt the intellectual
integrity of both the judge and the law review.
I
THE LAW REVIEW AS AN INSTITUTION WITHIN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A.

The Jurist's Intellectual Life

Why is it important that a jurist be a part of the profession's
intellectual life? At least since the advent of Justice Cardozo's classic, The Nature of the Judicial Process,6 it has been recognized that
judging inevitably involves a law-making function. Whether one
conceives of that law-making function as simply filling in the interstices of the legislature's handiwork or as engaging in far broader
policy-making, today we frankly acknowledge that the case-deciding
function performed daily by judges across this Land requires traversing the "gray areas" described so eloquently by the Supreme
5. See, e.g., Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990, 106th Cong.
(2000); Judicial Conference Expresses Opposition to Proposed Restrictions on Educational
Programs, FED. DISCOVERY NEws, Nov. 13, 2000; Douglas T. Kendall, Don't Play
Around with Judges, LEGAL TIMES, July 31, 2000, at 59; Rehnquist Opposes Bill That
Would Restrict FederalJudges' Educational Opportunities;Arnold, Barnett, Higginbotham,
Jamieson, and McLachlin Also Speak at Annual Meeting,A.L.I. REP. 3 (Summer 2001);
AbnerJ. Mikva, Foreword to DouG KENDALL ET AL., Nothingfor Free: How PrivateJudicial Seminars Are UnderminingEnvironmentalProtections and Breaking the Public's Tnst
(Cmty. Rights Counsel, Wash., D.C.), July 2000, at iii, available at http://
ivw.tripsforjudges.org/nothingforfree.h tml.
6. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJVDIcIAL PROCESS (1921). See
generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S ..
965 (1993) (discussing at length Cardozo's book).
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Court in Estin v. Estin7 and, if not turning the grays into black and
white, at least making the shades of gray more discernible.
As Cardozo suggested in his classic, this process requires that
the judge become immersed first in the ancient traditions of the
law. 8 The common law judge, faced with an ambiguity in the law,
instinctively looks to the past in an effort to discern the values our
law has embodied and the principles that have been fashioned out
of those values. But, as Cardozo also pointed out, reference to the
past, no matter how thorough and no matter how respectful, often
cannot provide an answer, or at least a complete answer, to the
problem at hand.9 It is necessary, therefore, for the jurist to look
beyond the traditional legal scholarship and to acquire a far
broader understanding of our nation's values and the customs and
traditions that embody those values) 0 Indeed, in gently remolding
ancient principle to respond to present situations, contemporary
social values and even scientific knowledge often become an important ingredient in the process of judicial decision-making. Of
course, throughout this process, there is the heavy countenveight of
the need for stability and certainty in the law. Indeed, Cardozo always made clear that this concern wras a grave one. I I
Because judges do-or rather must-make law, a preoccupation of our polity has been to ensure that this process is sufficiently
disciplined to ensure that judges do not, while performing this
function, rely on their personal predilections rather than on the
values embodied in the legal principles developed by the political
community they serve. Realizing that retaining principle in judicial
decision-making is a priority of the highest order in a democratic
society, we have placed in our constitutional system a variety of devices to ensure that judges craft their decisional law only while in
"conversation" with the other organs of government. Indeed, one
of the most important aspects of our constitutional system is that we
have structured our public institutions and have protected our private institutions to ensure that the process of judicial law-making
does not take place in a vacuum but in "conversation" with the
other branches of government and, indeed, with private institutions
7. 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) ("(T]here are few areas of the law in black and
white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable.").
8. See CARDozo, supra note 6, at 53-54.
9. See id. at 69-71.
10. See id. at 53-54, 162.
11. See id. at 149.
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of our polity. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this interdependence of the various parts of the legal profession very graphically:
I like to think of the profession of law as a multi-legged stoolone leg is the practicing bar, another leg is the judiciary, another leg is the academic lawyers, another leg the government
lawyers. No leg of the stool can support the profession by it1
self, and each leg is heavily interdependent on the others.
This process of dialogue constantly takes place among the
branches of government and with the parallel processes of state
governance.' 3 It also involves, however, another "dialogue"-the
continuous conversation between the judiciary and the academic
bar. This conversation provides a great deal of intellectual stimulation to the judicial function and also serves as a significant discipline on the judicial process.
The "academic bar" is, at least in the common law world, a
unique American contribution. The uniqueness of this American
contribution was made particularly evident during the Anglo-American Judicial Interchange in 1980. In that exercise, a group of
American lawyers and judges visited the United Kingdom to study
and to observe British criminal procedure. A similar British delegation then came to this country to participate in the same experience in our courts. Notably, only the American delegation
included law professors. Indeed, while British protocol ranked all
the lawyers according to the date of their admission to the bar,
American protocol gave precedence to the professorate over all
14
members of the practicing bar.
American protocol, although the product of a far more egalitarian culture in so many other ways, placed the legal academic community in such high esteem because the American legal culture has
come to recognize that this part of the profession plays a key role in
both stimulating and in disciplining the judicial process in its lawmaking function. In the United States, we have recognized, from
the earliest days of the Republic, that the judicial function at the
appellate level requires adherence to rigorous standards of scholarship in the judicial work product.

12. William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62

IND.

L.J. 151, 157

(1987).
13. See Kenneth F. Ripple, Process of ConstitutionalDecision Making, 25 VAL. U.
L. REv. 331 (1991).

14. Kenneth F. Ripple, TheJudge and the Academic Community, 50 01io Sr. L.J.
1237, 1237-38 (1989). The author was a member of the American delegation.
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As Professor White of the University of Virginia has chronicled
in his classic work, 15 the roots of this scholarly tradition in the nation's courts appear to have several branches. In the national government, Chief Justice Marshall's adherence to high standards of
scholarship in his groundbreaking opinions for the Supreme Court
of the United States not only enhanced the credibility of the new
tribunal's work product but also permitted the Court-from the beginning regarded suspiciously by many as an anti-majoritarian element in the newly-created democratic polity-to present its most
controversial decisions on the division of political power with an
aura of scholarly "disinterestedness" and objectivity. 16 Shortly
thereafter, Justice Story, Chancellor Kent of New York, and Chief
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts developed another strain in American judicial tradition as they labored to develop a sufficiently comprehensive and ascertainable body of law to permit the principled
adjudication of lawsuits brought by private litigants in the courts of
the new country. 17 In our own time, the term "scholarly tradition"
has most frequently been employed in a more focused way to describe those scholars and judges who view the tools of scholarship as
an intellectual discipline, an effective instrument in curbing a willful jurist's attempt to impose personal views on thejurisprudence.' 8
Although the use of academic scholarship to test the rigor ofjudicial analysis is an important element in the American craft ofjudging' the judiciary's reliance on the work product of the academic
bar is more broadly based. As the following pages will explore,
judges who do not believe that the scholar's tools are necessarily
suited for the task of restraining the willful judge still rely on the
work of the academic bar as a major source of intellectual
stimulation.
B.

Intellectual Conversations Between Jurists and Law Reviews

The nation's law reviews, through the publication of carefully
edited articles, provide the primary medium for a continuing conversation between the judiciary and the best minds in the
profession.
15. G. EDWARD NHrTE, THE AMERICa.%NJuDIcIA. TDmoN: PROFILES OF LEDING AMERCANJUDGES (expanded ed. 1988).
16. See id. at 35-36.
17. See id. at 35-63.
18. SeeJ. Skelly Wright, ProfessorBidwe4 the Scholarv Tradition, and Mhe Supreme
Court, 84 HAR,. L. RE%. 769, 770 n.5 (1971) (collecting principal academic
sources).
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Law reviews, as we know them today, are a relatively new institution in the intellectual life of the profession. 19 Although legal
periodicals made their debut quite early in the Country's history
(they were already known in England, Scotland, Ireland and India),
student-edited journals did not appear until the end of the nineteenth century. The HarvardLaw Review, which first published in
1887, is generally regarded as the first, although the University of
Pennsylvania can make a credible claim to being the oldest continuously published law review because it traces its lineage back to the
American Law Register, founded in 1852. Columbia and Yale soon
followed Harvard. In the early days, according to Justice Douglas,
20
many of the full-length articles were written by practitioners.
However, it did not take long for the academic bar to demonstrate
its ability to make a unique contribution. Justice Cardozo pointedly
noted this rise in the prestige of the law professors in the intellectual life of the profession:
Judges and advocates may not relish the admission, but the sobering truth is that leadership in the march of legal thought
has been passing in our day from the benches of the courts to
the chairs of the universities....
This change of leadership has stimulated a willingness to cite
the law review essays in briefs and opinions in order to buttress a
conclusion. More and more, the law reviews are becoming the organs of university life in the field of law and jurisprudence. The
advance in the prestige of the universities has been accompanied,
as might be expected, with a corresponding advance in the prestige
2
of their organs. '
From the beginning, there was skepticism about whether such
publications could make a significant contribution to the scholarly
life of the profession. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Yale Law
Journal, Chief Justice Hughes recalled that Justice Holmes once
confronted counsel, who had just cited a review as authority in an
argument before
the Supreme Court, as having relied upon the
"work of boys." 22 ChiefJudge Kaye of the Court of Appeals of New
York has noted that one of her predecessors, Benjamin Cardozo,
19. See Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J.
EDuc. 313, 315 n.8 (1989) (collecting other articles on the history of law
reviews).
20. William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure,40 WAsn-. L. REv. 227,
LEGAL

227 (1965).
21. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON
CoNTRACrs, at vii, ix (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1931).
22. Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE LJ. 737, 737 (1941).

TIlE LAW OF
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expressed similar sentiments.23 Nevertheless, as Chief Justice
Hughes also pointed out to the review at Yale, both student contributions and more extensive pieces by members of the professorate
soon altered judicial attitudes toward the usefulness of the reviews. 24 The sheer excellence of performance soon changed the
views of many. Of course, even in those days, selection of articles
was a significant factor in building a law review's reputation. The
editors of volume 4 of the HarvardLaw Review certainly chose well
when they published Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's The Right
25

to Privacy.

In the years that followed, the reviews served as a forum for
many of the great debates in American jurisprudence. One of the
best examples is the multilateral debate, hosted by a variety of law
journals, on the need for change in the choice of law rules in the
United States. The academic bar felt its way from the world of lex
loci delicti to government interest analysis and beyond.2 6 In other
fields, the law journals laid the foundation for major doctrinal advances. For instance, the law reviews certainly have made major
contributions on very fundamental methodological questions in2 7 and, more recently,
volving the interpretation of the 2Constitution
8
statutes.
of
interpretation
on the

23. See Kaye, supra note 19, at 316.
24. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 737.
25. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to PrivafV, 4 RuR% L
REv. 193 (1890-91).
26. See, eg., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Clwicaof-Law Problem, 47 R-L,,V. L
REv. 173 (1933); Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L. Reese, Choke of the AppliaMbleLaw,
52 CoLtJi. L. REv% 959 (1952); Brainerd Currie, Notes on Machods and O4jeztives in
the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Dui LJ. 171 (1959); Robert A. Leflar, Thie "FalseConflicts,-EtAlia, 48 B.U. L. Riv. 164 (1968).
27. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivhisin:Its Allure and Impossibilio,, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Ices of the "Passive1WrueA Comment on PincipleandExpediency inJudicialiRaiew,64 COLU M.L REV. 1 (1964);
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense ofJudidal Activism, 28 EMo" LJ. 901 (1979);
Richard Davies Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-and Its Future,42 Ofto ST.
L.J. 223 (1981); H.Jefferson Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent, 98
HAv. L. REv. 885 (1985); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEx. L. RE-v. 693 (1976); David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterprela-

tion, 63 U.

CHI.

L. REv. 877 (1996); Herbert Wechsler, Toward NATiral Pindplesof

ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).

28. See, e.g., Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutor 111o4d: An
Address, 43 U. Prrr. L. REx. 995 (1982); Kenneth I. Starr, Observalions About the
Uses of LegislativeHistoy, 1987 Dum LJ. 371 (1987); Albert Tate, Jr., The TwentiethCentury Primacy of Statutory Law, 81 MICH. L. RE,. 746 (1982).
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II
MULTIPLE ROLES OF THE LAW REVIEW
IN JUDICIAL LIFE
The law reviews have a multifaceted and nuanced relationship
with the nation's judiciary. Judges are, of course, readers of the
reviews and, indeed, a great deal of what is published in law reviews
is intended for the judiciary as one of the prime audiences. Judicial
work product, including published decisions, is also one of the
most important subjects of the articles, and law reviews therefore
serve as one of the chief sources of responsible criticism of judicial
decisions. Finally, judges often are contributors to the pages of the
journals. In the following subsections, this article examines each of
these roles and suggests adjustments which would improve the relationship of the judiciary and the academic bar.
A.

The Law Review as Informer of the Judicial Community

The practicing judge primarily reads the law reviews to stay current on significant developments in legal theory. In choosing
among articles, most judges, like other members of the profession,
tend to gravitate toward areas of personal intellectual interest. A
judge steeped in economics probably spends more time reading in
the field of law and economics. Those with strong philosophical
backgrounds naturally gravitate toward articles from that perspective. All judges seem to have an interest in history and in government. Trained in the discipline of the common law, judges tend to
look over their shoulders before they look ahead in confronting a
new intellectual problem. 29 The affairs of government have a natural attraction to those who must reconcile daily the interests of
those who govern and of those who are governed.
Judges certainly also depend on the law reviews to keep abreast
of new books in various fields of law. Although most judges read
constantly, even outside the scope of their judicial duties, the demands of judicial scheduling hardly leave time to read everything
one wants to read or needs to read. Priorities must be set and constantly adjusted. Reviews of newly published books are a great help
in this regard.
Ajudge's main interest in the law reviews, however, remains in
the traditional areas of legal scholarship. Here, judges read not
simply to "keep current," but as a part of the task of doing our primary work of deciding cases. ChiefJustice Hughes put it well when
he wrote: "It is not too much to say that, in confronting any serious
29. See

KENNETH F. RiPPLE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LITIGATION

476-94 (1984).
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problem, a wide-awake and careful judge will at once look to see if
the subject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and analyzed, in a good law periodical."3 0 As Judge Coffin of the First Circuit and ChiefJudge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
have both noted, a law review's treatment of an issue encountered
in a case often provides the jump spark that allows the judge to get
underway in the intellectual effort of shaping the opinion-of characterizing the issue and determining the significant arguments that
must be addressed.3 1 Judges are not looking simply for case compilations but for the author's intellectual contribution of suggesting
the strand that holds-or should hold-all that has gone before
together and also suggests the next step that must be taken. Faced
with a difficult issue for which there is no direct precedent, the
working judge will look to the law review to provide a dispassionate,
carefully crafted exposition of the development of the principle in
question across the country. As the law becomes more complex because the fields of human endeavor it touches become more complex, a judge is required, almost on a daily basis, to comprehendperhaps "appreciate" would be a more descriptive term-whole areas beyond the limits of that particular judge's training and experience. Justice Douglas summarized the frustration eloquently:
Who alive can draw from his environment the wisdom to decide the far reaching issues thatjudges are often called upon to
settle? Where is he to get his insight into factory and market
conditions to resolve an ambiguity in a statute? How can he
judge wisely on mergers or on labor arbitration? He needs
2
constant education and renewalA
At first, it may seem that the briefs in the case ought to perform this task, but it must be remembered that the parties do not
always approach a case so as to ensure that the decision-maker will
produce an opinion that brings coherence to the law. The brief
writer's primary objective is to win the case. As Judge Kaye has put
it, "[a]cademic writers therefore become genuine partners in the
courts' search for wisdom-for determining when and where to
33
move the law to meet the needs of our rapidly changing society."
Legal scholarship has changed significantly in the last few decades. Today, there is a general consensus that legal scholarship
30. Hughes, supra note 22, at 737.
31. See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF AJUDGE 157 (1980); Ka)e, supra note
19, at 319; see also Dennis Archer, Tw Inportance of the LmL Revias to theJudicia
and the Bar, 1 DEr. G.L. REv. 229, 237 (1991).
32. Douglas, supra note 20, at 228.
33. Kaye, supra note 19, at 319.
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must encompass entire areas of investigation that, a generation ago,
would have provoked little interest within the legal academic community. Many of today's legal scholars are interdisciplinary in their
interests and, indeed, in their conception of law. Some are committed to the view that law requires an extensive understanding of the
physical sciences, or of the social sciences (especially economics).
Others believe that law can only be pursued from a profound appreciation of the many strands of philosophical thought that play,
and have played, a major role in the molding of our polity.
As the complexity of legal issues has increased, the question
raised when law reviews first appeared on the scene has once again
been asked: whether student-run reviews are up to the challenge of
today's multifaceted legal scholarship. The view that such reviews
are not capable of providing a forum for multidisciplinary inquiries
is a position that ought to be approached with a great deal of skepticism. Its proponents do not appreciate fully the intellectual capacity of today's law student and the breadth and depth of the
education that a law student receives in today's law school. Nor do
they appreciate fully the capacity of the modem law school to be an
intellectual community in which the exchange of ideas between
faculty member and student is hardly confined to the classroom.
Law reviews therefore ought not to be confined to traditional
areas of legal analysis and scholarship. Nor must all published
pieces be ones of immediate use to the practicing bench and bar.
Speculative scholarship has a very special function in the constant
search for theoretical understanding and clarity. Nevertheless,
given their obligations to the judicial process, law reviews ought not
forsake their role of providing a forum for traditional legal scholarship. As Judge Edwards has stated so pointedly, the law reviews
most directly fulfill their time-honored role as the source of significant intellectual stimulation when, in the framework of the common law, they assist the judiciary in feeling its way from established
4
principles to new solutions for new problems.3
When the judge relies on the work product of a first-rate university publication, the judge assumes the intellectual integrity of
the product. University-sponsored and published scholarship is expected by any reader to be thorough and objective. Indeed, the
great respect accorded the academic community in our polity is
34. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 42-57 (1992); see also Archer, suplra note 31,

at 234 (noting the decline in appellate court citation of law reviews and the suggestion of empirical researchers that the decline is because legal scholarship is becoining less useful to those "who practice and work with the law").
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due in no small measure to the university's rigorous protection of
these hallmarks. Today, with increasing frequency, members of the
academic bar participate actively in the litigation process as counsel. In specialized fields, members of the practicing bar also contribute regularly to the law reviews. As law review editors evaluate
contributions for inclusion in their publication, they must remember that the time-honored practice of leaving your client "at the
door"3 5 when participating in professional academic endeavors is
not always honored by those who seek publication of their articles.
There is nothing wrong with publishing a piece that takes a particular point of view, but when the author has taken that point of view
because of another loyalty, the work product ought not to be held
out by the university as a legitimate academic publication in the
absence of full disclosure by the author of that loyalty. Members of
the practicing bar share the rich intellectual heritage of the profession and have every right to participate in its intellectual discourse.
But the integrity of the discussion must be assured, and the law review must ensure those standards are maintained.
This problem is not a new one. It w-as recognized over thirty
years ago by justice Douglas in his perceptive address to the staff of
University of Washington Law Review.36 Drawing from his observations of lawyers participating in various advisory roles in the legislative process, the Justice noted two factors that, in his view,
contributed to this danger in the law reviews. First, members of the
profession have become more specialized and, therefore, tend to
have more pronounced views on public policy questions in their
field of practice.3 7 Second, given the amount of specialization,
more members of the profession represent but one client and have
but one source of professional income.38 These members of the
profession, suggested the Justice, see issues of public policy
"through glasses of a different tint."39 The Justice suggested that
certain principles ought to guide editorial policy. 40 With some adaptation to suit the nature of current professional activity, they can
be summarized as follows:
1. If the author wrote the article for a fee or, in the case of a
practitioner, billed a client for the time spent preparing the
35. AimRc.AN LAW INsrrrurE, 77TH

ANNUAL

MrEminc,

RuL s PERT.u.INi.; TO

ANNuAL METriNGs 9.04 (2000).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Douglas, supra note 20.
See id. at 232.
See id. at 229.
Id.
See id. at 232.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

57/2000

article, that fact must be disclosed to the editorial board and, if
the board chooses nevertheless to publish the article, the fact
that the author received a fee ought to be disclosed to the
reader.
2. If the author received no fee for the article but has a client
whose interests are discussed in the article, that interest ought
to be disclosed.
3. If the author is a freelancer or a member of the academic
bar, that author ought to disclose any professional interests "in
41
the direction of certain types of litigation."
As the Justice also wrote, "[W]hen a special pleader enters the list,
42
[he ought to] show his colors."
B.

Law Review as Vehicle for Self-Examination

Judges also use the reviews as vehicles for self-examination. As
disciplined professionals, most judges want to do better work the
next time. It is when the reviews are performing this function of
critic of the judicial work product that they truly become, in the
words of Chief Justice Hughes, the profession's "fourth estate."" ,
Law review critique of the work product of the judiciary is a role of
very special constitutional dignity.4 4

In his famous address at

Rutgers University, Justice Brennan wrote eloquently of the special
relationship of the press and the judiciary:
[T]here exists a fundamental and necessary interdependence
of the Court and the press. The press needs the Court, if only
for the simple reason that the Court is the ultimate guardian of
the constitutional rights that support the press. And the Court
has a concomitant need for the press, because through the
press the Court receives the tacit and accumulated experience
of the nation, and-because the judgments of the Court ought
also to instruct and to inspire-the Court needs the medium of
45
the press to fulfill this task.

If the press can be said to play this special role by facilitating
informed communication between the judiciary and the political
community at large, the law review in its responsible critique of the
judiciary also certainly fulfills a role of constitutional dignity. Unlike other public matters, which the citizenry is presumably capable
41. Id. at 232.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Hughes, supra note 22, at 737.
See Ripple, supra note 14, at 1239-40.
William J. Brennan, Jr., Address by WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., 32

RUT.GERS

L.

REv. 173, 174 (1979).
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of understanding once the press communicates the facts, the work
product of judges requires interpretation to be understood fully.
The polity at large, including its non-lawyer leadership, must trust
the legal academic author-and the law review-to deal fairly with
the topic at hand.
Articles that are primarily doctrinal in content often offer constructive criticism of the judiciary's work and are supportive of the
mission of the judiciary because they help to ensure that the judicial work product remains principled and that law remains different
from politics. Nevertheless, in the law review's conscientious attempt to fulfill its role of responsible critic of the judiciary, it often
will encounter a significant impediment from within the academic
community. Those who see the future of legal scholarship to be in
more non-traditional areas, often denigrate, openly or indirectly,
the value of traditional legal scholarship that focuses on the work of
the courts. The law review editor considering an article in this latter category will often find such traditional work criticized as "sterile" or "unimaginative." This denigration of traditional legal
scholarship is aided and abetted in no small degree by the tenure
and promotion committees of both law schools and universities.
The worth of interdisciplinary work and other forms of more theoretical scholarship are a great deal easier for members of the academic community outside the law school to appreciate, and,
therefore, scholars with these interests find their work received with
a good deal more enthusiasm than the work of the traditional doctrinal scholar. In seeking advice from members of the academic
community about the worth of an article, law review editors ought
to keep in mind this institutional bias.
The first concern of the law review ought to be development of
an intellectual culture that welcomes into its editorial councils both
new interdisciplinary scholarship and more traditional forms of legal scholarship. What Judge Posner has called the "belittlement of
conventional legal scholarship" 46 is a reality in our profession today.
Yet that scholarship plays a vital part in the service that the law reviews render to the courts and to the nation as a whole.
A good deal of doctrinal analysis is found, of course, in the
student author contributions to the law reviews. Indeed, a good
number ofjudges no doubt begin their perusal of a new issue ith
the case comments, anxious to see if one of their cases has been
reviewed and if the long hours of crafting an opinion have pro46. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situalion in Legal Scholarship. 90 YM.E LJ.

1113, 1129 (1981).
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duced a solution that, in the eyes of a careful observer, is adequate
to the task. Annual surveys of the law, printed regularly in many
journals, afford a special opportunity for self-examination. In the
literature on student contributions, one encounters admonitions by
distinguished members of the bench about excesses in critical
pieces written by student authors. Although many of their admonitions are written in tongue-in-cheek style, the message is nevertheless very clear. One distinguished member of the bench wrote:
If an opinion reaches the wrong result, instead of immortalizing it as myopic or blundering, why not describe it as thoughtprovoking or interesting? If the result is right but the rationale
wrong, forget the rationale. It is the result that counts, and
who remembers rationales anyway? If the opinion is turgid or
incomprehensible, why not stay focused on the result or the
rationale? And if the writing is an unprincipled break from
stare decisis, a misstep in the mighty path
of the law, is it not
47
adequately put down as bold or novel?
ChiefJustice Taft is reported to have cautioned an audience of law
review members: "Don't be too hard on us, young gentlemen. Remember, if you will, we are the only courts you have. '48 Chief Justice Hughes, speaking to the members of the Yale Law Journal,
addressed the issue in a more serious vein:
If some members of this "fourth estate" of the law, conscious of
their prestige and influence, may seem at times to assume an
attitude approaching arrogance, they are at once subject to
counter-attack and a balance of sound criticism is attained,
with advantage to all concerned. It is idle to expect in legal
discussion and judicial opinion, in relation to close questions
of high importance, any greater unanimity of view than we find
in other domains of human thought-art, science, or theology.
And I think we may assume that a bench composed of law
school professors or law review editors, impartially chosen,
would exhibit views as varying as those of judges whose works
49
they appraise.
Chief Justice Hughes' discussion suggests an important qualification for the position of note or comment editor: judicial temperament. The editor needs to ensure that the notes published in the
review will perform the function of responsible critique and constructive suggestion. Additionally, editors in these positions need to
47. Kaye, supra note 19, at 314.
48. Quoted in Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Reviews, 28 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 915, 921 (1953).
49. Hughes, supra note 22, at 737-38.
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show certain flexibility on the question of determining when a topic
is "preempted." The Chief Justice suggests that the overall quality
of the discourse is improved when the bench and bar have access to
differing perspectives on a subject.5 0 Over-use of the law review's
"preemption doctrine" often stifles fruitful debate among members
of different law reviews, a debate that very often would improve immeasurably the overall quality of discourse on important doctrinal
issues. Even at the student level, there ought to be responsible discourse among authors.
Perhaps a more frequently encountered problem with some
student pieces (and perhaps noted especially by the judicial reader)
is the tendency of those in an academic environment who critique
judicial writings to expect every judicial witing to mirror the style
of academic scholarship. To be sure, every judicial work product
ought to contain sufficient elaboration to ensure that the reader
understands the principle that has guided the court to its decision.
But, oftentimes, especially when the law is clear and the court unanimous, it serves no useful purpose for the court to write a lengthy
opinion laced with footnotes. Indeed, such a treatment may well
send to the bench and bar a false message that the law is less clear
than it is. Judges are, above all else, involved in the judicial governance of the country; their opinions must reflect in substance, tone,
and format the actual state of the law.
When engaging in criticism of judicial work product, it is important to attempt to understand the task that was before the court
when it wrote the work. Courts, fearful of usurping the traditional
role of the political branches, tend to move slowly and to leave for
another day questions that need not be answered today. The academic mindset, however, is prone to be-and ought to be-far
more aggressive. Traditional legal scholarship is demanding. It requires care, discipline, and vision. It criticizes the cases; it traces
the twists and turns of the doctrine; and, perhaps most importantly,
it suggests the impact of the decision not only on the parties but
also on the jurisprudence.
C. Law Review as ForumforJudicialCommentary
Finally, judges participate in the work of the law reviews as contributing authors. This form of authorship is one of the only permissible outlets for a judge to engage in extrajudicial selfexpression. Indeed, the fact that it is permitted emphasizes the special role of the reviews in our professional life. Judges must, of
50. See generally id.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

57/2000

course, exercise circumspection in their choice of topic and manner of expression so as to make clear that they have not prejudged
an issue likely to come before them. Even with this limitation, however, judges can and do make a particular contribution to serious
academic scholarship.
One of the principal areas in which such a contribution can be
made is in demystifying for the bar and, indeed, for the public, the
process of judicial decision-making. The works of Judge Robert
Keeton on the role of legislative facts in decision-making, 5 ' and of
Justice Breyer 52 and Judge Easterbrook 53 on the issue of legislative
interpretation are good contemporary examples. The continuing
series entitled Judges on Judging in the Ohio State Law Journal has
provided a significant opportunity for judges to share important insights on how they perform their assigned function in the American
54
legal process.
One area of a judge's participation in the work of a law review
raises ethical concerns not dissimilar from the ones described earlier. Given the very special role of the law reviews as watchdogs of
the intellectual integrity of the judiciary's work product, a judge
ought to be very circumspect in advising a law review about the appropriateness of a particular article for publication. For instance,
judges ought to show particular caution when asked by a student
about the appropriateness of a particular topic for publication as a
note or as a comment. These student pieces often contain the most
direct criticism of the judicial work product and thus ought to be
free from judicial intrusion from the first day of their conception.
CONCLUSION
The academic bar, through the lawjournals, has a very special
relationship with the nation's judiciary. It provides the intellectual
fuel for the task of judging and it serves as the chief source of responsible criticism for the judicial work product. This special role,
indeed one of constitutional dignity, requires that the lawjournal's
independence be ensured by a high degree of sensitivity to conflicts
of interest by its editorial boards, its authors, by the broader academic community, and by the judiciary.
51. See Robert E. Keeton, LegislativeFacts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1988).
52. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992).
53. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
54. See, e.g., Ripple, supra note 14.
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